Overbearing Despair
April 7, 2010 by nannikapoor
Filed under internal security
The title of this post signifies the sentiments experienced by Indians of all hues but the corridors of power. These corridors refuse to accept the magnitude of the problem at hand when compared to their politically expedient machinations in adding fuel to the fire.( I’ll finish Naxalism in 2 – 3 years!!). The blogoshere today is charged and there are voices of dissent against the government and the Naxals. The intellectuals have fallen silent for the time being and the detractors of the ruling party are having a field day. There are a variety of “experts” who are opining on the future actions
It appears all so familiar in the Indian landscape.
Cut to Mumbai carnage or the parliament attack or the Francis beheading. A lot of brooha and promises of action but in the end all falls silent to a “Chalta hai” mindset of collective Indian polity. You can once again do a Mumbai or a parliament attack or a Dantewada with as much ease as the first time round. The system is averse to change, the politicians are rhetoric oriented and the Police incapable of any meaningful action. The battle against the Maoist is the battle between “us and them” – not state forces and maoists but between the centre and the state… “the buck stops on the chief ministers desk”. Well now that it has stopped temporarily there, till it stops again, what do you do?
The first and foremost is identification and acknowledgement of the fact that our national security apparatus is all too fragile to be breached time and over again by enemies of all hues, within or without. That the Naxal issue remains a law and order problem to be fought over between centre and state for brownie points is a pathetic reminder of our callous approach. There is a dire need to reorient, reorganise and restructure the national internal security apparatus. But I guess, that wouldn’t happen any time soon. In a post Mumbai post I had articulated a need to synergise our security – internal security but that I reckon fell on deaf ears. I hate to write this, but the administrative and police services in the country have to pull their socks and more to make common cause with national priorities. The Chief Ministers of various affected states and the Centre also need to be on the same page transcending their political ideologies.
That intrinsically the mechanism to maintain internal security does not include the Military, rich with experiences of over 60 years in fighting insurgencies, is a result of bureaucratic apathy and turf wars. Home secretary calls this a “skirmish and not a war”. Now we are sure, as is the wont of Indian political class, there would be a mad rush to incorporate the military in advisory, training or operational roles and taking advantage of the sentiment generated post Dantewara – this would materialise soon. How much and how, needs to be holistically articulated by the military and response should be pragmatic, ethical and be controlled and managed centrally transcending state boundaries. A tall order but has to be done deliberately and unemotionally. A mistake here would a disaster.
As is the case with operating amongst your own people, the operations are a distant second to sound intelligence mechanism. There is a need to concentrate on this vital aspect. The host of intelligence agencies operating within their closeted domains without accountability is frustrating the basic efforts against naxals. Centralisation of intelligence gathering, monitoring and dissemination in real-time is crucial to obviate jungle bashing resulting in tactical blunders by the police forces.
The operational network, based on a sound intelligence mechanism, has perforce to be spread across the red corridor. This has to comprise largely of the local forces, familiar with the area and superimposed by other police forces. This engagement has to be based on the principle of “One leg on the ground” where no roving entity is out of support of its base. Quick response teams based on helicopters and efficient communication system are crucial for area domination. An area grid has to be put in place. The focus must be on conducting intelligence based tactical operations. That requires a very high degree of planning, coordination and training. Drastic failure of tactical plans can alter the course of strategy. It is here that we must concentrate the most.
The success of operations would hinge strongly on three distinct phases of “Clear, Hold and Build”. Apart from the nuances of conduct of operations this mandates actions at the grass root level to comprehend and conduct the battle of “Winning hearts and minds”. Political and administrative neglect has allowed the situation to come to this pass and we can not afford to let it slide further.
Efficacy of the equipment comes next. With this perfectly executed ambush, the naxals have exposed the chinks in police armour. The landmine vehicle, meant to protect, in which 15 soldiers were travelling, went up in smithereens on the first landmine.
Tactically, the forces must comprehend the scale of naxal ambushes or attacks which always exceed 500 armed persons. In this case the number was possibly 1000. This has many ramifications on the conduct of anti naxal operations as opposed to insurgencies in Kashmir or North East, where the operations are conducted against much smaller groups.
I know, I write this in the comfort of my arm-chair and feel the guilt in not being able to overcome the Overbearing Despair. In the meanwhile, the Dantewada episode has emboldened the Naxals, angered the police and frustrated the political and bureaucratic classes. The backlash may result in fresh cases of Police atrocities and high handedness, as evident from some emotive statements ,resulting in rise in the levels of violence.
On the social and economic fronts of naxalism, I am linking an article posted in 2009. It merits a revisit now, though the situation has only worsened.
If India puts up a knee jerk response now, its security forces will have to pay much more in blood.
The solution needs deliberate and conscious decision-making – knee jerk actions will truly jerk the nation. These statistics are not healthy
The Indian apathy at addressing the issue of Naxalism has been well articulated. What merits attention is treating and tackling the red corridor as a single entity, militarily and economically to arrive at an early solution to the problem.
India has a deep history of fighting for political mileage but never for long term strategies aimed at emancipation of the masses. Had India done that, the situation would not have come to such a pass where we are forced to use armed forces against our own people. Still, there is time and there is a need to address the issues holistically.
Successive Indian governments have always initially neglected issues of internal security and then try and mange them once they are almost uncontrollable or when they are forced to do so. The recent Dantewada incident is yet another such point after which the government would be forced to take things seriously and give a serious thought.
With the continuous use of CPOs/state police in static policing duties, there is a mind set that needs to be changed (they may be forced to do it now) and a drastic improvement in their eqpt profile is an urgent need. They need to be provided with state of the art eqpt like the armed forces operating in J&K and the NE have. This coupled with good CI/CT training would definitely go a long way in improving their performance and not be sitting ducks.
At the same time, the central and the state governments need to focus on the ‘Why’ of this problem because if it is not done now, it may take ages before this movement is militarily forced to come to the negotiating table.
Though the CPOs/state police have said that they would be able to tackle the issue, military dply may not be far away if things continue in the same manner and the issue not addressesed holistiocally.
@ Rajesh
You are right, the situation has worsened due to state apathy..there is a need to get our act together cutting across all party lines. Why did the naxals launch such a vicious attack, is also what should bother every stake holder. Is there too much of rhetoric by the political class and little resolve to conduct efficient operations by poorly trained, poorly led and demotivated CRPF troops – that has emboldened the naxals to hit out violently to prove their point. The state needs to answer all these questions and take appropriate concrete steps to manage the crisis holistically.
@ Micky and Chanakya
Agree with you. Thanx
I feel that Indian administration and specially the bureaucrats and police conducting Operation Green Hunt have not comprehend what it means to “Clear, Hold and Build”. There is a need to launch a multi pronged drive to assuage the feelings of the tribals combined with selective int based operations to separate the maoists from innocent tribals caught in the crossfire. Only a comprehensive approach, launched sensitively, will achieve tangible results.
The military must contribute in advisory role and share their insurgency experiences to bring down the level of violence from both sides. There are a variety of other roles which the military must get involved in now short of actual troop deployment.
I read the intervew of Brig Ponwar in Telegraph which points to the failures of police leadership to undergo the hardships of training required to fight Naxals. If the force is badly led, poorly trained and thrown into the jungles as such, massacres will be the norm. This piece from Telegraph speaks for it self
In the context of the revived debate over training of CRPF personnel, Brig. Ponwar said: “The CRPF do not train with me, although I will be happy to. They do not know how this battle needs to be fought, we at the warfare school do.”
Asked why the CRPF had spurned his offers, Ponwar bluntly said: “Because they think they know everything. Pressure should come on them to learn. If we want our soldiers to go into battle, give them a fighting chance, don’t feed them as fodder to the enemy.”
Ponwar has issues with the mass-contact aspect of forces deployed in Chhattisgarh, too. “You cannot win a campaign if you don’t have civilian support,” he said. “And little is done to win people over. The forces behave like a feudal army, not a force that has come to the aid of people. That is the main reason why there is such poor intelligence and information available with the forces, they don’t have a relationship with the people.”
To him, winning public confidence must be the starting point. “Ask the widows if their pensions are coming, ask if water is available, ask if they need medicine, make friends and then you will get support in return. If you have lost the people, you have lost the battle to begin with.”
I would call it criminal indifference that the police forces will not derive benefit from an experienced ex armyman in their midst .
going by what is said above re brig ponwar and his comments re working with the local janta, public confidence etc, I must say i am happily surprised by the fauj’s ability to think. Sorry but I am a lifelong left of centre wallah who was told and who believed, that the army was really no professions for literate people since at its core was a brutal idea : killing to defend. i am beginning to realise the naivete behind that belief.
tentative explanation for the police’s inability to understand this basic point re popular support: the police in an area is usually fairly homogenous and bears a distinct ethnic affinity to the populace. this usually means that the “humanity” of the insurgent gets clouded by his familiarity, (“I also faced a dying village an incompetent adminstration and a deaf politics but look at what I did…i jstruggled and joined the army….and look at what this man is doing, killing the very people i try to sustain with my army pay) allowing police to become thullas in every sense of that word. the army with its multi-racial/ multi ethnic character always provides an outside perspective…what if this was happening in my village, how would i react? is a question that the army is more likely to answer with a greater degree of objetivity thatn the police ever can given the latters’deep and disgusting involvement with the sewer of local politics.
shake up local law enforcement, make sure state police forces are a judicious mix of locals and people from other parts of the country. just having an IPS man from outside the state (but who owes a lifelong alegiancve to that state) at the head will not break this pattern.
totally support the idea of rationalising training across the borad for all sorets of civil and m,ilitary defence personnel.
@ Gautam
Thanks for underlining the concept of scholar warrior. The soldiers who have faced bullets understand the need to maintain peace through peaceful methods. In an insurgency, winning hearts and minds is essential to wean the people away from the insurgents. The soldier engaged in counter insurgency thus need to be sensitive to this else many more insurgents will be created – the police needs to understand this.
Ref Ajai Pant’s post. I’m surprised that ajai speaks so ignorantly about the army as any poll held by many magazines / newspapers always put the army on a pedestal professionally. Over 30 countries request our army for training their officers on various courses as they consider us among the most professional armies today & the best led especially at the middle & lower levels of leadership. The army is also running training institutions in other countries for their armies, again due to their high regard for our training & professionalism.
Arjun
I seek forgiveness but no where have I argued that army is not capable, especially at the middle and lower levels. My point is that the police and bureaucracy do not use this great reservoir of talent in the country to learn counter insurgency holistically. From the battle of hearts abd minds to the actual conduct of operations. Brig. Bhonsale says the same.
The one man committee has just stopped at saying that the CRPF launched a poor operation without police support!!!
When will we learn to apply the correct WHAM and COIN strategy mix to move forward and approach the problem as more than Law and Order problem and a state subject without any coordination along the red corridor?