Maoist Conundrum:The Psychological Underpinnings of Combat Soldiering

WHAT THE CRPF NEEDS TO LEARN AND UNLEARN

The Maoist conundrum has another side that has rarely been commented upon, simply because the numbers of armchair analysts who add their voices to the Tower of Maoist Babel far outnumber the few sane voices of people with grass roots knowledge of what happens on the ground, especially by the uniformed man in combat. A fair idea has emerged from an embedded journalist who spent 15 months with US troops fighting the Taliban in Korengal Valley, Afghanistan, Sebastian Junger. Some extracts from his recent book on his combat experiences, “War” can easily be transposed to the jungles of Dantewada:

“When a man is hit the first thing that usually happens is someone yells for a medic. Every soldier is trained in combat medicine – which can pretty much be defined as slowing the bleeding enough to get the man on to a medevac helicopter – and whoever is nearest to the casualty tries to administer first aid until the medic arrives. If it’s a chest wound the lungs may have to be decompressed, which means shoving a 14-gauge angio­catheter into the chest cavity to let air escape. Otherwise, air can get sucked into the pleural cavity through the wound and collapse the lungs until the man suffocates. A man can survive a bullet to the abdomen but die in minutes from a leg or an arm wound if the round hits an artery. A man who is bleeding out will be pale and slow-speaking and awash in his own blood…

You could be anything back home – shy, ugly, rich, poor, unpopular – and it won’t matter because it’s of no consequence in a firefight. The only thing that matters is your level of dedication to the rest of the group, and that is almost impossible to fake…

For some reason there is a profound and mysterious gratification to the reciprocal agreement to protect another person with your life, and combat is virtually the only situation in which that happens regularly. Combat isn’t simply a matter of risk, though; it’s also a matter of mastery… One of the beguiling things about combat is that it’s so complex, there’s no way to predict the outcome. That means that any ragtag militia, no matter how small and poorly equipped, might conceivably defeat a superior force if it fights well enough. ‘Every action produces a counter­action on the enemy’s part,’ an American correspondent named Jack Belden wrote about combat during the Second World War. ‘The thousands of interlocking actions throw up millions of little frictions, accidents and chances, from which there emanates an all-embracing fog of uncertainty.’

Combat fog obscures your fate – obscures when and where you might die – and from that unknown is born a desperate bond between the men. That bond is the core experience of combat and the only thing you can absolutely count on. The willingness to die for another person is a form of love that even religions fail to inspire, and the experience of it changes a person profoundly…”

The point worth taking home is that the soldier combating terror is under extraordinary stress and needs our unconditional support, not our savage censure and condemnation.

IS ARMY/AIR FORCE EMPLOYMENT TO COMBAT MAOIST EXTREMISM VIABLE?

One of the vociferous demands that surfaced in the aftermath of the Dantewada massacre was that the Maoist threat was beyond the capability of the CPMF to handle and should be handed over to the regular armed forces; in specific, the Army assisted by the Air Force. To an extent, this demand received a fillip from the public statements made by the then Air Force Chief that the IAF, if instructed, would be willing to lend support. This demand was reinforced by the fact that one of the IAF helicopters performing logistics duties in the Chattisgarh area had been fired at and the IAF wanted GoI sanction to retaliate in kind.

Matters have cooled down since then, perhaps because the scale of Maoist attacks has reduced since then. The debate, however, still remains current that the Army and Air Force need to get involved. In all fairness, there is an equally vociferous school that maintains that, the lead agency nominated by GoI for the task, the CRPF, must overcome its deficiencies in manning, equipment, mindset and leadership and continue as the lead agency. There are also those who worry that the regular armed forces should stay clear and focus on their primary charter; protecting the sovereignty of the nation against external threats.  It will be worthwhile picking up the threads of the debate, before taking a call on what may be the right solution. Let us begin with the CRPF.

The question that begs an answer is the reason why the CRPF is unable to get its act together? The  CRPF has grown into a big organization with battalions of varied kinds including 181 executive Battalions, 2 Mahila (Women) Battalions, 10 RAF Battalions, 6 CoBRA Battalions, the only really worthwhile counter LWE force with CRPF, 2 Disaster Management  Battalions and several other training, administrative institutions and hospitals. The general feeling is that, at heart, CRPF remains an essentially police force with a feudal mindset and near total lack of the skill sets needed to combat LWE. A supporting view point is that the force is hopelessly over tasked and over stretched. The standard rule for all forces is to have one-third of its troopers deployed in operations, one-third in training and one-third in rest, preparing for the next deployment. With the kind of deployment that the CRPF (and, by extension, most if not all CPMF) have, where is the time for them to train and rest adequately? This question must be seen in the context of the propensity of Indian media and its experts to blame the CPMFs for their lack of professionalism. This shortage of CPMFs has exacerbated because the states that are constitutionally responsible for law and order, have created no reserve capacity in their police forces. It is easier for them to ask for central forces and watch disconnected from the sidelines, all the time making sly innuendos about the centre’s lack of performance, even as they cover their own lack of commitment in officialese and political rhetoric.

A respected, hands-on ex DG BSF, Mr. EN Rammohan is of a different opinion. In a recent article, he implies that the root causes for lack of success against the Naxals lies with the functioning of Government, not so much with the CRPF. The government has to address the root causes which are changes in its policy on land and forest rights and mining. It must make Indian democracy more attractive than Maoist revolution. The issue is not so much about development as it is about land and its exploitation rights. The successful implementation of land laws in Kerala must serve as a model. His thrust is clear: replacing the CRPF with the Army might well make only a cosmetic difference unless the base causes of conflict are addressed. In any case, he states bluntly that the Army is not recommended. The CPO and CPMF suffer from poor leadership and must address this deficiency. He mentions how his personal leadership as IG BSF in Kashmir made a huge difference in the functioning of his force – and indeed it did.  This is not the case with the paramilitary, but something that can and must be improved. He also suggests that the Army also has troops from depressed classes and getting Army jawans to take punitive action against their kith and kin may not be correct.

Chandran D. Suba from the think tank IPCS wonders if all the other options before calling for the Army’s help have been explored. For example, Andhra Pradesh has successfully used the Grey Hounds, while J&K still relies upon the Special Operations Group (SOG). Besides, the State Police has also used irregular formations, for example, the Village Defence Committees (VDC’s) in J&K; Salwa Judum was a similar attempt that has become controversial in Chattisgarh. Besides, States have also used surrendered militants – the Ikhwans in J&K, and the SULFA in Assam, as a counter-militancy strategy. The military, he feels will be unsuitable, as it is trained differently; will not understand the nuances of anti-Maoist operations and (by implication) involve in overkill, leading to more problems. It would, he feels, also “be unwise to expect the military to change its very basis of operational working, in other words, its raison d’être.”

CLAWS articulates that “for success, CRPF units must upgrade the quality of their counter-insurgency tactics, techniques and procedures and be armed with modern weapons for close-quarter battle and surveillance, reconnaissance and communications equipment suitable for jungle terrain. Leadership at the level of commanding officer (CO) should be drawn through lateral induction of volunteers from the Army, as was done when the BSF was initially raised. He notes regrettably, that in the context of the CPO and PMF forces, certainly the CRPF, the CO is responsible only for administration, leaving hands on leadership more often than not to his subordinates.

Some writers, Radhakrishna Rao amongst them, make the point that although developmental strategists oppose employment of the regular armed forces, there is a school of opinion that favours surgical strikes against Naxalite hideouts by the army units specializing in guerrilla and jungle warfare—with the close air support from the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has offered to field a all band radar from the Swedish arms consortium Saab, that can detect and explode IED’s hidden under roads by remote control. There is also talk of using remote sensing Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) satellites for acquisition of intelligence on Naxalite movements.

All said and done, India’s Defence Minister AK Antony is clear on the question of using armed forces to fight Naxalites. “Whether in West Bengal or any other areas, our view is that employing armed forces for internal security is the last resort,” says Antony.

Be that as it may, a recent Times of India headline has it that the ‘Army is bracing to take on the Naxals’ (17 June 2010). The report has it that up to five divisions of the Army are being readied for deployment. A training centre is planned to be opened that would put through other ranks of the supporting arms such as armour and artillery. In the traditional way the Army does counter insurgency, a grid is apparently to be deployed and the Maoists isolated from the populace. Brigadier level advisers have been earmarked. Firdaus Ahmed, who wrote this piece which quotes the report, does balance out his observations by saying that, assuming that the
Army is seemingly the best instrument, a far better approach would still be to find a political solution first, which is negotiations based, development led and which precludes violence.

SOME PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGY AND THE WAY AHEAD

Strategy has, today, many takers as a term, but like most management jargon in currency; its employment originated and began with the military. It is therefore felt necessary to explain what strategy is about, before suggesting its usage for attempting to tackle the complex politico-military problems that the Maoist conundrum has thrown up.

Strategy refers to a plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal as also the terms and conditions that it is fought on, or whether it should be fought at all. Traditionally, it comprises of the four levels of warfare: political levels or grand strategy, strategy, military operations and tactics, which, simply put, are the means of executing military operations.

In analyzing strategy, it is helpful to conceptualize strategy, operations, and tactics as “perspectives” rather than the more commonly used “levels” of war as indicated above. The suggestion that emerges is to  view our anti-Maoist strategy through the prism of perspectives, where what needs to be done gets clearly outlined, rather than the standard wisdom of using levels that have a pronounced tendency to overlap, leading to serious accountability and ‘whose domain?’ problems.

A Possible Strategy

To restore peace and harmony in those areas of the Indian union disturbed by Maoist activity (including the Red Corridor) by ensuring political consensus, synergy of political processes and military operations across the centre-state continuum and by correct sequencing of the corrective process, with security preceding development and rebuilding. As an adjunct, creating and shaping the correct diplomatic environment that denies and/or minimizes external moral and material support to home grown terror organisations.

Acceptance of Reality

Going objectively through the wealth of detail this paper provides, it appears clear that all players should unreservedly accept that the Maoist problem is purely political in content and that it can only be resolved by political skill, political unity across party and ideological lines and steadfast as well as by display of consistent, resolute, political will and, most importantly, public will. A key part of this realisation in a responsible democracy such as ours, should be the realisation that the military (and, by default, military action to quell Maoist activism) is only a small though key component of the above political strategy. This writer, with 38 years plus years of military experience behind him, can say without any hesitation whatsoever, that, in the existing scheme of things, the regular armed forces have little other than a ‘behind the scenes, supportive role’ to play. The word “military” as used here, therefore applicable to the CPO and CPMF uniformed community and certainly not to the Indian Army and Indian Air Force.

Building of Consensus for the Anti-Maoist Strategy to Succeed

This is a prime and urgent responsibility of the Government of the day and an exercise which has been sadly neglected, lost in the mire of “we” and “they”, the abject helplessness in repeating ad nauseum that constitutionally, “law and order” is a state responsibility and therefore the centre can do no more than suggest what needs to be done. The makers of the Indian Constitution did not perceive the Centre to play the role of Emperor Nero strumming a fiddle while Rome burnt; they meant that the Government of the day should be proactive and not evasive and distanced, when the country they served was going up in flames on matters of “form” rather than “content”.

The writer is not about to make the suggestion that law and order should be made a subject for the centre to handle as its charter, by steering a constitutional amendment because this would amount to tinkering with the basic framework of the constitution. What the writer does want to state firmly is that the centre must not renege on its responsibility of building the national consensus across party and ideological lines as also with its billion plus population that the Maoist problem must be resolved politically and with an approach that meets with general approval of all players. This has to be the basis of creating the desired political and public will, without which the problem will remain a festering sore that has the potential to spread like wildfire.

Moral and Practical Underpinnings of the anti-Maoist Strategy

The strategy must be based on the following 12 underpinnings:

• Accepting that the root of the problem is the thoughtless, “make-hay-while-the-sun-shines” denial of basic rights to India’s 80 million Tribals and under privileged classes, especially in the Red Corridor. These basic rights include loss of habitat, forest cover, and land rights based on traditional ownership, the benefits emerging from economic and industrial growth spawned by mineral, land, forest, tourist and crop wealth emanating from their habitat. It includes the right to education, “water, fresh air, living of the produce of forest and our land” in a sustainable manner, housing and health care.
• Understanding with brutal clarity that the “enemy” is not the Tribals and the other underprivileged and landless classes but those land and mineral as well as forest wealth sharks and political opportunists who have hived off the tribal riches for pecuniary and vote related tunnel vision political gain. Thus, even as military operations must continue those who have chosen to pick up arms against the state, the vast majority who are victims or who sit on the fence for want of a more practical option must not be ostracized and punished. This implies substantial deworming of the entire anti Maoist operational as well as political machinery and needs a well thought out, long gestation campaign in its own right.
• Ensuring that rapid economic growth taking place in India, especially in hinterland areas inhabited by Tribals and other underprivileged classes has spin off benefits and measurable economic impact on the inhabitants commensurate with the wealth created by the Union and/or those leased exploitation rights. Ensuring that the process of exploitation involves the locals rather than bypass them, as is the current norm.
• Accepting that security must precede development and not the other way around, as some theoretically inclined but vocal ideologues keep insisting upon.
• Empowering as well as liberating the CPO and CPMF organisations by ensuring strict date bound implementation of police reforms, including the declaration of disturbed areas as Special Security Zones, along with the additionalities that will make such zones work across state boundaries without loss of synergy, control and capability of the CPO and CPMF forces employed therein.
• Capacity building in all spheres of Government endeavour starting with basic administration and inclusive of intelligence acquisition, manning, weaponry, logistics support, training, financial benefits and recognition for serving in hardship areas and so on in an accountable, time bound and measurable manner.
• Instead of reinventing the wheel, accepting that the Petraeus Doctrine as played out in Iraq of Clear, Hold and Build, be the basis of the marriage between security and development. The first involves military operations to clear territory of insurgents, the second calls for holding territory and protecting the population from insurgent attacks, and the third consolidates military successes by building functional institutions of state that in turn can deliver effective governance. The crying need for security to precede development and thereafter remain co-terminus with it is also succinctly brought out in this prescient and practical sequencing.
• While the security forces are equipped, trained and prepared to handle the Clear and Build stages, they find themselves inadequate to take on the challenge of the third, Build stage (more correctly, the Rebuild stage, after the destruction caused by the insurgents and collateral damage caused during counter-insurgency operations). This is an undesirable outcome. It is therefore difficult to overstate the importance of a sound Build strategy. As it launches into the war against Naxalites, the UPA government must realise that it cannot be successful unless it has a clear strategy for the endgame, which focuses on the Build portion of the Petraeus formulation.
• Examining why the state succeeding in quelling militancy in Mizoram and Punjab, in Malaya and in Ireland and wisely adapting those lessons learnt and deeds done, to succeed inside (as well as limit the further growth) the Red Corridor.
• Treating the CPO and CPMF no longer in the divisive “we” and “they” manner that currently prevails, but being proud of their sacrifices and the extraordinarily difficult operating environment in which they are compelled to deliver; treating them as “us”. Public support and empathy, recognition of sacrifices made; in fact treating them humanely will end up humanizing these forces as well as improving their public interface with the vast multitude amongst which the Maoists hide and thrive.
• Institutionally ensuring the “We” rather than the “I” approach in inter-ministerial and inter-departmental functioning for all players involved in the formalization and execution of the anti-Maoist strategy.

The Way Ahead

Notwithstanding any criticism one may level at the current Government for not being able to put their act together and conceptualise as well as execute an effective anti Maoist strategy, the objective citizen has to accept that an effort to get things right is being made by the PM in particular and some ministries in general; as also the Planning Commission. The leading protagonists besides the PM who come in for some accolades are the HM and the Minister for Environment. Some think tanks, blogs and intellectuals whose musings have been quoted in this paper have also clearly understood the plot and have made some excellent suggestions that need to be accepted by Government.

This writer is, however, loath to give unconditional credit to the UPA for what is being done, for the simple reason that there continues to be visible lack of synergy in what the Government states and what it actually does on the ground. The Government takes a step forward, but has, on occasion, recanted and taken it back. The public is therefore aware that the lobby pushing for rapid mineral exploitation by national and international vendors is upset with the Environment Minister for stalling their projects on grounds of conscience and because, if he approves the project, the already deprived will be worse off. Similarly, the issue of police reforms drags on, with part work done and the balance under the clichéd banner of “work in progress”. Form wise, the MHA has indeed tightened up its act, what with regular updates etc. Where it lacks is in content, in terms of launching of security operations that have put the Maoists under pressure. Also, the MHA, though the lead ministry for anti Maoist operations, so far as public perception goes, is hardly losing sleep over the Tower of Babel or the cacophony of disparate noises by ministries, departments, states and others affected by the problem. There is simply an absence of synergy.

This is where the suggestion made by SK Singh and Nitin Pai in their landmark article   of creating a new, dedicated statutory organisation to engage in the endgame of counter-insurgency is timely and apt. Let us hear the details in the authors own (paraphrased by this writer) words: “We shall use the acronym CIMPCOR, or Civilian Military Partnership for Conflict Resolution to describe it. Mandate. CIMPCOR’s mandate should be to fill the gap between emergency humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance. It should be charged with the responsibility to put in place the building blocks for sustainable development, by building basic infrastructure, delivering basic public services and unleashing economic freedom… It should have institutional mechanisms to partner with the security forces, the local political and community leaders and specialist government agencies engaged in agriculture, education, power, telecommunications and water resources development… Administratively, CIMPCOR should be placed under a revamped Home Ministry—but with senior-level staff drawn from various ministries and the Planning Commission… If this is not possible for any reason, the next best alternative is to place CIMPCOR as an autonomous agency under the Prime Minister’s Office…

Staffing. CIMPCOR’s staffing could be drawn from three streams: first, a core staff charged with building and maintaining the capacity to engage in short to medium-term interventions anywhere in India. Second, its deployable resources could be “lend-leased” from the armed forces, central paramilitary forces, government departments, NGOs and some public-sector units (banks, for instance). Third, it could draw from a reserve of individual specialists—with expertise in various domains and experience in various regional contexts—employed through a system of call-down contracts. To ensure co-ordination with the security forces engaged in the Hold stage, CIMPCOR should have adequate representation of serving and retired security forces personnel at all levels. To use the ‘Rotterdam principle’, CIMPCOR ‘should be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary.’

Deployment terms. CIMPCOR’s deployment could vary from six months to two years, but should be capped—perhaps at no more than three years. An exit strategy should be written into CIMPCOR’s charter, mandating the transfer of responsibilities to the state government to start within one year of its deployment. There are several areas in India where CIMPCOR is needed today. In the future, it is conceivable that as India’s global role expands in tandem with its economic and geopolitical interests, CIMPCOR might even have to be deployed in foreign contexts.”

In the final analysis, this writer feels that the time for creating such an agency under the PMO, not the MHA, for the simple reason that the MHA will not be able to create the required synergy needed from political parties, states, departments, media and the lay public. Only the PMO has the clout, reach and credibility as well as slaved Government resources to be able to do that. This must be done and without delay. Procrastination now will spoil the script in the manner that Scarlet O’Hara spoilt the script in the classic Hollywood film of love, war and loss. You cannot have Rhett Butler walk out on Scarlet, fed up with her procrastination and declaration of intent, compelling him to utter those unforgettable cinematic words frozen in time, “Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn”.

Let the UPA not walk out on the trust reposed in it by a billion plus people, by displaying its procrastination, its inability to really put its anti Maoist strategy into motion. Let it not say “I don’t give a damn”.

Related articles

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• CRPF constable killed in Maoist blast (thehindu.com)