NATO Strike and US Pakistan Relations
November 29, 2011 by Team SAISA
Filed under Analysis, geopolitics
The year did not have to end on a low note in US Pakistan relations for the sake of solution to the Af Pak problem leading up to the Bonn Summit. The death of 25 Pakistan soldiers in a NATO attack in Mohmand tribal agency has sent Pakistan public opinion in a tizzy. Not that relations between the two were getting any better after the Osama killing in Abbotabad earlier this year. As per Bruce Reidel, the distrust between the two had largely been growing because of double dealing by Pakistan which was responsible for a fair number of ISAF killings in Afghanistan. Then there was the Raymond Davis affair, Mike Mullen’s “veritable arm” comment about the ISI, attack on the US embassy on Kabul and the “memogate” scandal. All these are not signs of allies going into a war on terror.
Pakistan Army still reeling under the humiliation of the Abbotabad raid and the attack on Mehran Naval Base has been hard pressed to explain its control over the nation’s security to the nation. If US Pakistan relation is “need based” as explained by ISI Chief Shuja Pasha, then nurturing it in an environment of mutual distrust is all the more dangerous for both the sides. It is this very humiliation of the armed forces that shall see the extent of leverage being exercised over the Americans in ensuring it saves face on one hand and gets the nation behind it by bringing anti Americanism to the fore. So purely from this point of view the army will play to the gallery to extract maximum mileage from the incident. The public opinion in Pakistan is that of intense rage at being hit and the army would encash this sentiment to tighten its grip over the NATO alliance. Pakistan has also threatened to boycott the Bonn Security Conference where the fate of neighboring Afghanistan is to be discussed – something it was already mulling over as it gives Pakistan more time.
The US Pakistan relation is based on three basic premises of Security, Afghan reconciliation and military and development aid. The intense reaction to this attack has put all these in a jeopardy – to the short term advantage of Pakistan. Axiomatically security along the Durand Line has been largely compromised and the Taliban would be intensely motivated and assisted by ISI to take on American targets in the revenge mode – and all this in with a straight face while pressurising the West to keep the aid coming. The closing of supply routes has happened before and these shall be opened again albeit at a greater cost.
In sum the incident has thrown open vast opportunities for the Pakistan Army to bolster its battered image and tighten its grip at home and in Afghanistan. It will seek greater quid pro quo as the US needs Pakistan’s support till 2014 and Pakistan remains dependent on development and military aid from the US. Thus apparently the conditions are ripe for Pakistan army to leverage its”rogue” status to squeeze America – something Obama will have to contend with.
China and Russia have condemned the attack and asked US to respect the sovereignty of Pakistan even while fighting the militants. China has a lot at stake in Afghanistan as it has come into Afghanistan for economic reasons post US departure. This has to have had Obama clearance and shows Kayani’s clout with USA as well as Pakistan forward thinking. The significance of the fact that while Pakistan is a US ally in Afghanistan but with very strong Chinese backing can not be diluted. China thus will have a major role to play in the resumption of “Business as Usual”.
For the militant Taliban this is a shot in the arm as they would receive greater support from Pakistan Army and the ISI to bolster their cause to build pressure on the US. The ISI would be pleased to extend its proxy war against high profile American targets. That, apart from the Army’s renewed centrality in Pakistan, may be the worst takeaway of the incident. However, despite all the brouhaha there is little prospect of the U.S. and Pakistan breaking off ties, as both know their symbiosis is mandatory for each other – at least temporarily.
Related articles
- Us-pakistan Relations (socyberty.com)
- When NATO is the Enemy: Pakistan Seethes After the Attack – TIME (time.com)
- After NATO strike, can US-Pakistan relations be patched up one more time? – Christian Science Monitor (csmonitor.com)
- Pakistan Halts Supplies to US’s Afghanistan Troops After NATO Air Strike – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)
- Pakistan-U.S. Ties Suffer a Setback After NATO’s Attack (time.com)
- NATO: Pakistan resumes some cooperation (cbsnews.com)
- STRATFOR on the latest strain in US/Pakistan relations (aleksandreia.wordpress.com)
Dear Sir,
Have to disagree, how does the fact that the Pakistan Army was unable to respond against an attack on a defensive position that lasted for over two hours make it any less humiliating for them? In fact, it clearly brings out the fact that the Pakistan Army is in pretty terrible shape. In any case there is talk that the Pakistani position was probably providing covering fire to assist militants infiltrate into Afghanistan, an extremely common tactic that is commonly used in J&K, and it got its just desserts. It is time that the Indian Army also relooks at its war fighting doctrine and responds in a more effective manner as and when Pakistani positions attempt to support infiltration in J&K.
We totally agree with you that the Pakistan Army was assisting infiltration LC style and got a befitting reply. But in the current game it will fight tooth and nail to prove American air power was used without provocation. The larger game is to counter their own duplicity to prove American complicity. This would enable them to wring America in concessions on military and the aid front.
To an Indian mind this sounds all too familiar but the Americans will find it tough to justify their military stance post the attack. The high casualty figure augurs well for the Pakistan Army’s negotiations.
Pakistan Army will never accept that it had anything to do with the incident. Instead it will leverage this situation to bully US in a corner while training the Jihadis and the Taliban against US targets.
The NATO are now working on an assumption that the Taliban “manufactured” the fire fight between US and Pak post by first firing at the joint US Afghan post and then melting away towards the Pak post. This resulted in commanders on the spot requesting for back up. If the Taliban did that they prove yet another principle of Hybrid War -ie deception!
Maybe it is my disbelief that NATO could be so naive as to take out two Pak Posts on the basis of complaints of “fire coming from there” by Afghan Army persons… Surely ISAF is more professional than that. Also, whatever ISAF does is with US overarching. Could US have permitted this yahoo interaction? Doubt it.
What about the other version that the Pakis had fired at US helicopters to down one and blame in on the Taliban? The still more credible one that the Pakis were sleeping with the devil; allowing Taliban to target US/ISAF assets from these posts? far more believable…
Amongst most of the arguments of US Pakistan relations I find this by Leslie Gelb most convincing
the most specious and costly explanation of American interests in this region is that the United States is, in good part, fighting in Afghanistan in order to “save Pakistan.” The argument is that somehow “losing Afghanistan” would mean that Pakistan and its nuclear weapons would be more likely to fall under the control of Taliban and al Qaeda extremists. Apparently, the Pakistani leaders themselves don’t agree with this logic at all. In practice, they have been helping the Taliban to bloody American troops and mortally wound the American presence in Afghanistan. If the Pakistanis really felt their future depended on a U.S. victory in Afghanistan, they wouldn’t dream of doing this. Common sense suggests that whatever the future of Afghanistan, the fate of the far larger and much more complicated state of Pakistan will surely depend on what happens inside Pakistan.