Checkmating the Dragon’s growing influence

Major Gen. G. G. Dwivedi (Retd)

The continuing march into South and Southeast Asia is part of China’s well-calibrated policy in consonance with the overall grand design. While China professes peace and friendliness, its strategic aim remains marginalising India through overt engagement and covert containment

Aircraft carrier “Varyag” that China bought from Ukraine under refit at a Chinese port. It will add to a growing military clout just as other powers in Asia are becoming uneasy about Beijing’s more strident claims over disputed seas in the region.

POST 1949, China’s external and domestic policies were based on the ideology of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. This kept it out of crucial multi-lateral platforms of global politics. It was the second revolution orchestrated under Deng Xiaoping that brought about a paradigm change, with public policy coming in the ambit of mainstream Chinese politics.

Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) perceives itself as an ascendant power while America is seen on the decline. The main objective of China’s policy is to shape a unipolar Asia by preventing the emergence of rival powers. Its policies are driven by long-term strategic concerns and actions guided by national goals. China has always considered Asia-Pacific as its area of influence. It has redefined its earlier “Periphery” policy by encompassing the concept of an “extended neighbourhood”. There is marked increase in Chinese presence in the region. The PRC has made concerted efforts to marginalise India in south and southeast Asia.

PRC’s Grand Vision

Traditionally, the Chinese have countervailed adversaries through alliances to avoid direct confrontations. Mao’s era, due to domestic compulsions, saw China allied with the Soviets. Post 1978, Deng pursued an “open-door foreign policy”. Continuing this policy, Jiang Zemin ensured external interface through an “independent foreign policy for peace”. His successor, Hu Jintao, has adopted a “balanced development” approach instead of a “GDP-centric growth model”, to create a harmonious society. Hence, ensuring peaceful rise by maintaining a conducive periphery is the cornerstone of China’s current foreign policy.

In the prevailing environment, China’s external interest are threefold — Ensure a secure periphery, sustain regional stability along with economic vibrancy and maintain territorial integrity. With the exception of Taiwan and Sparatly islands, China has by and large realised its primary objectives during the last decade. This is in consonance with its strategic vision of a “peaceful rise”.

Throughout history, China was the pre-eminent political and military power in east Asia. Therefore, the PRC leadership is keen to change the international status quo by replacing the US as the hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past decade Chinese leaders have adopted an increasingly moderate and flexible approach vis-a-vis its strategic neighbourhood, resulting in remarkable expansion of Chinese influence. The salient facets of Beijing’s strategy are proactive initiatives at the political, economic and diplomatic levels to develop a common ground by putting aside differences and fostering closer bilateral/multilateral arrangements .

Chinese Inroads Into Asia

China has traditionally wielded significant influence in southeast Asia, which constitutes a fluid turf due to the power game dynamics and often referred to by Chinese scholars as a soft underbelly. PRC has pursued its designs through skilled diplomacy, binding the region to China politically, economically and militarily. China’s broad objectives in the region are:

• Work towards peaceful and prosperous South East Asia to sustain modernisation.
• Ensure diminution of U S influence in the region.
• Seek passive and strategically neutral Japan.
• Endeavour for sovereign authority over South China Sea.

China’s policy towards south east Asia is marked by soft paddling outstanding regional disputes and willingness to engage in multilateral dialogue while projecting an attitude of good neighbourliness. Chinese inroads into south Asia region have been primary economics centric.

Conscious that its rise manifests concern among its neighbours, PRC has tried to dispel fears of a “China threat” and demonstrated its desire to behave as a responsible power. However, China is wary of Japan, which has refused to exclude Taiwan Strait from its security agreement with the US. Beijing also knows it has limited influence in the Korean Peninsula. China’s activism in southeast Asia, therefore, is an important element of its response against potential containment.

Southeast Asian nations have responded rather favourably to Chinese regional activism. Due to historical and geopolitical realities, these nations have reconciled to the inevitability of living in China’s shadow. Countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are able to leverage their positions optimally by exploiting the resources of both China and the US. Even Myanmar, due to its political isolation, has been a major beneficiary of China’s assistance as reciprocation for its favourable policies towards China.

Despite growing Chinese influence, the US continues to retain a dominating position in southeast Asia. The US–ASEAN Enhanced Partnership Agreement of 2005 seeking closer cooperation in trade, investment and security is a step towards ensuring greater involvement in the region. ASEAN too seeks enhanced US cooperation to obviate overdependence on China The choices before Washington are either to maintain status quo by following the current policy through bilateral alliances, or assign Beijing participatory role in the region. The way Obama administration is courting Beijing indicates that US’ Asia policy is no more driven by an overarching geopolitical framework.
PRC’s Growing Influence in South Asia.

South Asia, due to its strategic importance, is considered by China as part of its extended periphery. PRC perceives India as a rival and views the latter’s strategic posturing directed towards seeking hegemony in the region, exercising control in the Indian Ocean and containing China, while striving to emerge as a military power. China’s strategic interests in south Asia are largely economic. In consonance with the expansion of its strategic space, China has deepened its influence in India’s neighbourhood. China’s march into south Asia gained momentum when it went for market economy in the 1980s, opening new vistas beyond Pakistan. Salient facets that merit attention are:

Beijing has an enduring strategic partnership with Islamabad. Change in the political leadership or shift in policies in either country has had no impact on continuing mutual trust and cooperation. Pakistan’s strategic significance is priceless for China, especially in the zero sum game orchestrated by Beijing in the Indian subcontinent. While denying access to southwest and central Asia, Pakistan has provided a direct link to China with Eurasia through the Karakoram highway. Presence of PLA soldiers in the Gilgit area for infrastructure projects has added new dimension to the military cooperation between the two countries. The Gwadar Port, where PRC has made huge investments, provides Beijing direct linkage to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir to tie down a large number of Indian troops dilutes India’s capabilities against China.

Bangladesh is a doorway for China to India’s northeast and both share a common ground on many issues. China values Bangladesh for its immense natural gas reserves, accessibility and geographic proximity to Myanmar. PRC has extended lucrative economic packages for infrastructure development and socio-economic needs of Bangladesh. China is a also a major supplier of arms and equipment to Bangladesh.

Nepal’s strategic location is of immense importance to PRC, which has cultivated Kathmandu as part of its larger security agenda. With construction of the “Friendship Highway” from Lhasa to Kathmandu, China has gained strategic access into south Asia. The proposed extension of the Qinghai-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu will further enhance the connectivity. There is also active defense cooperation between the two countries. PRC has always sought to use Nepal as a counter-weight to India and ensure Kathmandu’s neutrality in a Sino-Indian standoff.
China cherishes bilateral relations with Colombo given Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka is also crucial to China for implementing its “String of Pearls” strategy. Close relations between the two serves China’s interest in obviating Indian predominance. Colombo is a major beneficiary of Beijing’s economic and military assistance.

As for Sino-Indian interface, there is definite concern regarding the concurrent rise of the two big powers. The relations between the two giants are complex and marked by contradictions. Despite the agreement on confidence building measures with regards to the boundary dispute, there is underlying antagonism, suspicion and trust deficit. In India the perception is that China has persistently endeavoured to deny it the deserved stakes in the international arena. The boundary issue and Dalai Lama’s presence in India are two major irritants in bilateral relations. Chinese officials attach considerable importance to India’s military capability and its impact on the periphery, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region.

Appraisal

In orchestration of its “peaceful rise”, the Chinese leadership is convinced that sustained economic development has to be accorded the highest priority. In the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP), both soft and hard power are equally relevant. For enhancing CNP and emerging as a global player, China requires strategic space and enlarged area of influence. Its continuing march into south and southeast Asia is part of a well-calibrated Asia policy in consonance with the overall grand design. China has used its strategic advantage to leverage and consolidate its standing in the region.

PRC has specially developed close relations and partnerships with India’s neighbours. Today, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka affirm to “One China” policy and unequivocally support China on the sensitive Tibet issue. They speak one voice with regards to China’s entry into SAARC, disregarding Delhi’s discomfort. Whereas PRC professes a policy of peace and friendliness, its strategic aim remains marginalising India through overt engagement and covert containment. However, PRC does make efforts to keep India from making strategic alliances with the US.
It is imperative that India crafts a deliberate and effective strategy to ensure its rightful status as a regional power. This implies seriously contending the growing Chinese influence around its periphery and simultaneously striving to enlarge its footprint particularly in southeast and central Asia. The approach has to be multi- pronged, a combination of soft and hard power. India’s relations with southeast Asia should have three fold objectives: Strengthen bilateral relations, institutionalise political and economic mechanism and mutually address regional security concerns. India has to play a more proactive role in the region. Even President Obama, while addressing the Parliament during his visit here, stated that India should upgrade its relations from “looking East” to “engaging East”.

India’s emergence is seen as positive development by Asia-Pacific nations. They now see India as a power that could play a balancing role in the region. ASEAN accounts for 9.42 per cent of the global trade and is India’s fourth largest trading partner with bilateral trade of over $50 billion. As India is not a direct competitor for ASEAN export-led economies, the opportunities for mutual gains are considerable. In defence cooperation, there is vast scope in areas like combating terrorism, maritime security, sharing intelligence, capacity building and training.

To ensure a favourable neighbourhood, India needs to take fresh initiatives that combine good economics and astute diplomacy. A shortsighted approach vacillating between appeasement and coercion has not yielded the desired results. In the prevailing environment, smaller neighbours are not averse to India playing a lead role as long as their interests are well served. Politically, India must treat China on equal footing and not give in to its coercive diplomacy. Underplaying the Dragon’s growing capability would be a serious strategic blunder. India ought to improve its potential in the application of combat power on its northern borders and enhance force projection capability in the region.

China’s inroads into the strategic neighbourhood are in sync with its grand design, as it prepares to take its rightful place in the new world order. In a systematic manner, Beijing has made long term investments in the region to gain a strategic foothold, while dispelling concerns about a “China Threat’. Favourable response from majority of the nations in the region implies a major diplomatic triumph for Beijing. Expanding influence of China in the Asia-Pacific region is a reality. To cope with the live challenge, India needs to formulate a pragmatic national security policy after undertaking a holistic strategic review in the long term global perspective. Keeping in view the magnitude and complexities of the security spectrum, bold reforms would be required to be put in place to institute a dynamic mechanism to ensure seamless coordination and synergy that are the inescapable prerequisites for effective implementation.

The writer is a former Assistant Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, served as the Defence Attaché in China. This article first appeared in Tribune.

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