Than Shwe and Cameron Come Calling

The pace of events does throw you off guard, especially when WikiLeaks have provided media with ammunition to last a long time. But then, being the analysts that we are, General Than Shwe and Premier Cameron’s visit just can not be ignored. So, while the net discovers more on WikiLeaks, let us see what these visits mean to India and the region at large.

First, the general. Of course the visit attracted obvious furor from the international community and the Human Rights groups castigating him for his anti democracy stance and activities in Myanmar. Indian, however, chose realpolitik over emotions. Aung San Suu Kyi supporters staged protests on the eve of the visit to mark their disgust and anger.

Shrewd and astute that he is, he let his Indian counterparts know that he was here for promoting his interests and in so doing pitched his resources as the bargaining chip – between India and China. C Raja Mohan argues this succinctly when he says, “Playing India and China against each other and both of them against the West, he has showcased Asia’s new geopolitics on the Arakan coast of the Bay of Bengal.” He of course did not mention Bangladesh, which is also in contention because of the gas row and the India – Bangladesh- Myanmar pipeline to ferry Myanmar gas to India.

Premier Indian interests in Myanmar are the transport corridor to Vietnam through Myanmar, the counter insurgency cooperation through infrastructure development of the North East (Connect Mizoram and the North East through the Kaladan river starting at Sittwe port) and Gas. Connectivity was an important part of the agenda. However what tops the chart is India’s desire to limit Chinese influence in its backyard.

The Chinese want to avoid a trip down the Malacca Strait for their African and Gulf Oil and are laying twin pipelines to transport this oil to Yunnan. China has signed a long-term agreement with Myanmar for the exploitation of its hydrocarbon reserves and for the transportation of oil and gas through a 1,100 km overland pipeline from Kyaukryu port in Myanmar to the border city of Ruili in Yunnan. This pipeline will reduce the distance by 1,200 km and make China less dependent on the Malacca Straits, also termed in the strategic circles as the Malacca Dilemma. China is also developing Sittwe as a commercial port on the west coast. At Sittwe, both the Indian and Chinese path seem to cross – a possible zone of conflict. The Chinese project pegged at $ 2 Billion is likely to be completed in two years while the Indian transport corridor may take up to 4 years. Then there are the offshore oil platforms outsourced by Myanmar.

All these developments heighten the probability of greater friction between the two Asian Tigers.  The key to opening their landlocked territories and overcoming the Malacca Dilemma thus lies with Than Shwe. Connectivity in this relationship assumes an important dimension. This is especially so when the dynamics of control of Indian Ocean are interplayed from a strategic perspective. Both India and China are keen to retain sea control here which marginalizes American dominance and creates conditions for greater friction. A sea farer’s assessment would take us into the nuances of the strategy of String of Pearls. India for one does not want Myanmar to be the golden bead in this string. The other worrisome golden bead being Pakistan, which now stands connected through Karakoram Highway to the Gwadar port.

That explains the Indian stance where she wants to limit Chinese influence in Myanmar and promote an arrangement for return of democracy.

President Pratibha Patil’s statement, that Myanmar was central to India’s “Look East” policy, and that it stood as a gateway to the relationship between India and other Asean countries, paved the way for a large number of agreements on trade, finance, technology, arms and border issues. A copy and paste of some of the agreements are:

India will  provide high-speed patrol boats, rifles with night vision devices and armored personnel carriers to help combat Indian insurgent groups operating along the Indo-Burma border.

The EXIM bank of India will provide a US $60 million line of credit to fund various railway projects, and New Delhi pledged $10 million for the purchase of modern agricultural equipment.

Burma also welcomed a “substantial additional investment” by two Indian oil companies for the development of projects in Burmese offshore blocks A-1 and A-3, including a natural gas pipeline now under construction at Ramree, an island off Burma’s Arakan coast.

Under the telecommunication agreement, the official fiber telecommunication link between India and Burma via Moreh and Mandalay will be upgraded to a microwave link which will be financed by a $6 million line of credit from India. A new optical fiber link between Monywa in upper Burma to Rhi-Zawkhathar will also be undertaken with Indian assistance.

Agreements were also signed for direct banking links between the two countries, tourism, human resource development such as language training, a center to enhance IT skills, a scholarship program for officials and the construction of an industrial training center in Pakokku.

As per Western analysts, the whole reason that India needs Myanmar’s natural gas is because its economy is booming — and that booming economy is one of the prime reasons the British Prime Minister is so interested in forging a new “special relationship” with India. On public view is the 126-fighter jet deal has political overtones and cameron is likely to push its case strongly with the Indian leadership. A fledgling economic growth of 2.6% mandates Britain gets this $1.2 Billion deal. As events go Britain signed a deal for 57 Hawk AJTs worth $ 700 million with Britain. Apart from the business generated this will boost Cameron’s Asia orientation, after US and the EU have disappointed Britain.

Apparently, Miliband  played heavily on Cameroon’s mind and he took some  steps to undo the follies of British foreign policy of the labour era. May be, to put the record straight, he did not hesitate to ruffle feathers in Rawalpindi when he exhorted Pakistan to do more against terror in his characteristic style.

“We cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country (Pakistan) is allowed to look both ways and is able, in any way, to promote the export of terror, whether to India or whether to Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world,’’ It is not right for Pakistan to maintain relations with “crooks’’ who are promoting terror.

As the largest British delegation to visit India in living memory much more than pleasantries and odd deals are expected from this visit. It might as well be a composite package encompassing trade, education, defence and collaboration.