South Asia’s Nuclear Nemesis

The new international environment has altered the concept of national security. Threats to international peace and security now emanate not from strategic confrontation between the major powers, but from regional conflicts and tensions and the spread of violent extremism by non state actors, threatening nation-states from within and transcending state boundaries and international security. This environment of security imbalance has forced weaker states to adopt a repertoire of strategies for survival and national security that includes alliances and strategic partnerships, supporting low-intensity conflicts, and engaging in limited wars and nuclear deterrence.

South Asia has witnessed increased regional tensions, a rise in religious extremism, a growing arms race, crisis stand-offs, and even armed conflict in recent years. Nuclear tests did not bring an era of genuine stability between India and Pakistan. Though military crisis in the region did not escalate into full-fledged wars, underscoring the need for greater imagination to rein in the risks due to the fragility of relations between two nuclear neighbours in an increasingly complex set of circumstances can not be over emphasised.

Pakistan’s primary and immediate threat now is from within. Its western borderls are rapidly converting into a battleground where ungoverned tribal space in proximity to the porous and disputed border is degenerating into insurgency both to its east into Pakistan as well as to its west into Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda threat has now metastasized into a spreading insurgency in the tribal borderlands, which is taking a heavy toll on both Pakistan and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The democratic (?) government in Pakistan has hit the ground running; but still mired in domestic politics, it has been unable to focus on the Al Qaeda and Taliban threat that is rapidly expanding its influence and targeting strategy. In the collusive and paradoxical battle between the Pakistan military and Al Qaeda / Taliban, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the Al Qaeda hands has increased many folds. Pakistan military’s relationship between the good and bad Taliban and domestic compulsions of managing the Mullahs has resulted in complicated dynamics in the region. Here, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish as to who is controlling whom.

The most tragic aspect of this conundrum is the success of Al Qaeda in creating cracks of misunderstanding between Pakistan and the Western allies, while exacerbating tensions and mistrust between Pakistan’s traditional adversaries, India and Afghanistan. For example, Pakistan’s security nightmare which perceives India-Afghanistan collusion in squeezing Pakistan is exacerbated, while the Indian and Afghan security establishments perceive Pakistani Intelligence malfeasance as perpetuating the Afghan imbroglio. The suicide attacks against the soft Indian targets was one such act to undermine the Indo – Afghan relationship

Worse, the outcome of this confusion and blame generates real advantage for Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Any terrorist act that pits Kabul, New Delhi, and Islamabad against each other and intensifies existing tensions and crises also throws Washington off balance, allowing Al Qaeda and its sympathizers the time and space to recoup, reorganize, and reequip, and continue to survive. Pakistan playing Taliban as its strategic hedge against India complicates the situation further.

The only silver lining in this unhealthy regional security picture was the slowly improving relationship between India and Pakistan before the Mumbai attacks. Though relations are tense and still fragile, there is a glimmer of hope in this overall crisis-ridden relationship. The dialogue process between India and Pakistan has not been somewhat resilient in the face of significant setbacks and changing domestic, political, and international landscapes within each. The rhetoric based talks “at” each other on 25 Feb may pave the way for future constructive dialogues but for the time being, the relationship remains quaint and abrasive.

It is very improbable that a nuclear war between Pakistan and India would spontaneously occur. The history of the region and strategic nuclear weapons theories suggest that a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would result from an uninhibited escalation of a conventional war vice a spontaneous unleashing of nuclear arsenals. Each country would test the threshold of the other before pressing the nuclear button. This calculation may go awry bringing the subcontinent to doom.

In its present state South Asia seems to be the one place in the world most likely to suffer nuclear warfare due to the seemingly undiminished national, religious, and ethnic animosities between India and Pakistan.

Furthermore, lack of transparency in nuclear programs leaves room to doubt the security surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and the safeguards preventing accidental launches or falling into the hands of non state actors.

Therefore, discussions aimed at mitigating a catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia should focus mostly on the unilateral and bilateral anti-escalation measures Pakistan and India can take regarding existing issues. Additionally, each country’s perception of its security is interwoven with the political, diplomatic, and strategic movements of the external powers that wield significant influence in the region. Coherent and consistent behavior that discourages conventional and nuclear escalation, although sometimes imperceptibly, is needed from mediators. Without this, both Pakistan and India are unlikely to feel confident enough to reduce the aggressive posturing of their conventional forces over existing cross-border issues, leaving the escalation from insurgencies to conventional warfare to nuclear warfare a very real possibility.

The next round of negotiations thus needs to factor this crucial aspect.