Indo Pak Talks – Mediations?

So India finally gives up its claim to non negotiation phase with Pakistan while Kasab remains in Indian prison as a moot witness to the Pakistani carnage on 26/11. Whatever the compulsions for this reconciliatory approach, there is a confused picture emerging as the Feb 25 talks in Delhi are being organised. Gilani and Qureshi are busy humming the K tone and have repeatedly supported the JUD and LeT type groups to intensify anti India rhetoric. This is likely to be intensified some more. What are the reasons for India holding the olive branch? Whether it is pressure from US or from forces within the country is any body’s guess. Whatever, it can’t be denied that Pakistani Political establishment is fulfilling the agendas of the Mullahs, military and ISI, who hold the key to their survival at a time when the military is bogged down in cleansing its Western borders. It is here that an insight into the  Pakistani Establishment and inter alia Pakistani military mind merits consideration.

In the 2008 elections, Pakistan’s politicians scored a major victory against what is euphemistically called “the establishment” in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the battle between “the establishment” and the politicians is far from over. “The establishment,” made up of politicized generals, intelligence officials and Pakistan’s managerial class bankers, civil servants, some overseas businesspersons, beneficiaries of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – will not give up easily.

The attack on Mumbai was bound to strain Indo-Pak relations, which were on the mend. The only beneficiaries of this are the Pakistani army and their intelligence agency who are reluctantly forced to intensify operations against al-Qaeda, Taliban and the tribal militias as demanded by Washington. For the last few months, a campaign had been launched both in the US and the Pakistani media on how a solution to Kashmir issue is vital to give the Pakistani army a sense of security in the east so that it can concentrate on the western borders.

Some American analysts were inclined to buy this thesis and there were expectations that this would have found a place in General David Petraeus’s surge plan for Afghanistan. But India had pointed out that the peace process was making good progress and the people of Kashmir were about to vote in yet another free election. Obama had said that there was no threat from India to Pakistan and the threat was from domestic extremism and Taliban.

Voices in Pakistan were asking for a “grand national compromise” that brings to an end the vilification and demonization of politicians, restores the military’s prestige and ends its political role, limits the intelligence agencies to external security functions and results in a government that unites the Pakistani nation against terrorism and disintegration.

In these circumstances it became necessary for the Pakistani army to create tensions. It made overtures to jihadi organisations within Pakistan and signalled to the AI-Qaeda , Taliban and other jihadi groups that in spite of the new  government in Pakistan, the Pakistani army and ISI were still friendly to them( The good and the bad Taliban). Heightened tension with India will lead to the Pakistani army exercising greater influence on the civilian government. It would also prevent the PPP leaders from pursuing India-friendly policies, which they publicly said that they intended to do.

Any escalation of tension on the Indo-Pakistan border is likely to result in international attention on the subcontinent and the Kashmir issue. Thus on the Kashmir day, when India offered secretary level talks with Pakistan, the Muzzafarabad conclave, duly supported by the Pakistani establishment, have chosen to intensify their demands for Azad Kashmir. This serves the Pakistani focus on the Kashmir issue while their Army is engaged in Swat and Waziristan. The establishment therefore provides de facto moral and material support to JUD and other groups to keep the issue alive for domestic and international consumption.

Talks with Pakistan are a good step and must resume earliest but who to talk to is more critical than what to talk about. While the militant organizations in Pakistan are raising the specter of Jihad, India needs to take note of this involvement of Pakistan military in keeping India tied down through their proxies. At a moment like this, it would be important to establish channels of communication with the Pakistan establishment, ala Hillary Clinton, to make any headway. Key issue here would be to compare our negotiating advantages vis a vis Hillary Clinton. Military would be eager to talk to Hillary but would they ever accept talking to India when they can achieve their objectives better through the weak political establishment? Pakistan military would find it absolutely unpalatable to be sitting across the table with India – something they construe bad for their image within the country, especially amongst the Jihadist organizations.

Under such diabolic power equations in Pakistan what are the likely results of any friendly overture if India can’t talk to the military and find workable solutions? Indian priority of Pakistan dismantling the terror mechanism in Pakistan is unlikely to be acceptable to the military and the politicians alike who will offer the oft repeated parable of being victims of terror themselves. For India to make an offer for talks on the eve of celebration of Kashmir Day by the Jihadi organizations in Pakistan duly supported by the government is somewhat puzzling and displays a lack of clear understanding of the dynamics of negotiations with Pakistan.

If anything, the Pakistan Foreign Minister painted the town red by shouting from roof tops that India was brought to the negotiating table by their strong stand on 26/11 and other terror issues. Gilani repeated no negotiations without the Kashmir issue and muttered words such as “war”. It remains to be seen if these rhetorics have been at the behest of the “establishment” which still controls the weak political set up in Pakistan.

For the past sixty yrs, separated at birth and joined at the hip-Indian and Pakistani politicians or military have used each other as punching bags to meet their political ends for domestic consumption. The mullah military-ISI nexus, smarting from the 1971 humiliation adopted terrorism to bleed India through a thousand cuts. Simultaneously, they went nuclear to offset Indian conventional asymmetry by “eating grass”. The bellicosity can only increase, if both India and Pakistan do not shed the baggage of the past and arrive at negotiated settlement to their problems. It would be simplistic to argue this but then what is the way forward? If the current level of distrust and animosity continues to exist, South Asia would remain on fire for this millennium also.

In the aftermath of 26/11, India continues to be angry and will the current offer of talks look at new solutions to old problems. Where would these talks lead us? Do we need to follow the “Lahore Bus Journey” or the “Agra Summit” format or is there a case for exploring out of the box solution to Indo Pak rivalry which have drained both nations, economically and socially.

Amongst the range of solutions being put on the table by thinkers across the time spectrum there is a need to comprehend that Pune type actions will be launched to undermine any peace overtures, mostly, at the behest of the establishment. The establishment is flush with funds and support from the Obama administration, courtesy the Af-Pak policy. Should India look for a series of constructive engagement, even mediation, now before US withdraws from the region strengthening the hands of the establishment further? It would take strong will on both sides of the borders to achieve this congruence- but it would be well worth it.

If the United States withdraws from the region, leaving Kabul to the Taliban and without dismantling the military-jihadi complex, there is a risk that India will once again become the primary target.

There is a larger game plan of Al Qaeda and Taliban supported by Pak terror groups to destabilise the region. Both Indian and Pakistani policy makers need to see through this.

We,  of course, can still say “Aman ki Asha” and hope the hawks on both sides see sense in a negotiated settlement lest our children’s children are also handed down this relationship of hate.