Perspectives on Draw Down in Afghanistan
US began nominal withdrawal with pulling out of 1000 troops comprising two groups - the Iowa National Guard’s 1st Squadron, 113th Cavalry Regiment soldiers from Parwan province in eastern Afghanistan, and the other group from the capital, Kabul. It is not yet clear whether the surge of 33,000 troops has yielded any tangible results but the pull back has begun.
U.S. President Barack Obama announced in June that he would pull 10,000 of the extra troops out in 2011 and the remaining 23,000 by the summer of 2012. This may be a move with eyes on the elections but there are serious issues facing ISAF. As per the plan, Afghan security forces are to take over security responsibility from foreign forces in seven areas of the country this summer. Afghan forces will then take the lead in securing the entire country by the end of 2014. Then there is the ongoing negotiation of a “strategic alliance” between Washington and Kabul that would permit a substantial US military presence in Afghanistan even after that country assumes responsibility for its own security in 2014.
It is difficult to guage the success ISAF has had in neutralising the insurgents vis a vis their stated claims. As the US troops move East towards Pakistan the Southern provinces are indicating a disturbing trend of recovering lost ground. Simultaneously, assassinations of close aids and relative of President Hamid Karzai indicate that the will of the Taliban to be emboldened after the pull out has been announced. This complicates answer to the question – Is US departing earlier than militarily and politically acceptable? Further, any ill timed move of early withdrawal may embolden the Taliban and demoralise the fledgling ANA and ANP.
Pakistan is watching the draw down with a keen eye. Its stakes are too high when it comes to establishment of a Taliban government in Kabul. Next the push by the ISAF on its Western borders has forced it to intensify anti insurgency operations in Khyber Pashtunwala (KP) and Waziristan. Something Pakistan wishes to avoid. The recent low in the US Pakistan relationship and the diplomatic row are irritants which add to US seeking accountability in spending the $ 800 million military aid. US wants Pakistan to do more in helping it fight the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan, in control of US supply routes, has its eyes set on a Pakistan brokered Taliban led dispensation, once the draw down is complete in 2014. On the other hand, Pakistan’s leverage over US in terms of supply loads will decrease with the draw down thanks to Russia’s cooperation in expanding the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). This involves landing US supplies in Baltic Sea ports and then transporting them to Afghanistan through Russia and the Central Asian countries over a 3,200-mile railway. An expensive but necessary step by US.
On the other side Adm Mike Mullen on his recent tour to Afghanistan has called the badlands of Afghanistan Pakistan Borders as the true “Epicentre of Terror”. As per him unless Pakistan moved against terrorists like the Afghan Haqqani network, it could affect relations between Washington and Islamabad, already affected adversely after the Osama killing.
Critics have said Obama’s decision to bring troops home from Afghanistan faster than the military recommended could jeopardize the next major push of the war, to unseat insurgents in the east. US Commanders continue to debate whether Pakistan is unable — or unwilling — to eliminate the safe haven within its borders used by the Haqqani network, a powerful insurgent group that American officials say is nurtured by Pakistani security and intelligence officers to maintain influence in Afghanistan. In recent weeks, the Obama administration moved to delay $800 million in aid to Pakistan, to put further pressure on the government, which has been reluctant to push into North Waziristan and go after the Haqqani network.
As US, British and other troops continue to pull out, the chances of the Taliban taking over the whole country remain small. A bigger danger is Afghanistan’s de facto partition into two zones, one run by the Taliban, the other by Kabul. That may be disastrous.
The paradoxes of the draw down are not simple. If the US withdraws too early it would be accused of repeating another Vietnam – where the split Afghanistan may once again turn into an Islamic inferno, suitably aided and abetted by Pakistan.
From an Indian standpoint, the return of Taliban to rule Afghanistan in any of the above combinations would be disastrous. India, apparently, has not made up its mind on how to tackle a Taliban ruled Afghanistan. However commentators argue that Taliban, once in power, may influence various Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to join hands with them. Apart from combining forces with various Islamic groups( LeT, TTP, Haqqani et al) operating in the region including ISI controlled groups and the CAR Islamic rebels, it is quite likely that the fresh target would be India and specifically Jammu and Kashmir.
India also has to protect its investments in Afghanistan in any future government of Afghanistan while meeting its energy needs when it comes to its relations with CAR. A Taliban domination would adversely affect this equation.
Related articles
- US begins drawdown of forces from Afghanistan (longwarjournal.org)
- US Pullout From Afghanistan Starting Slowly (greginsd.wordpress.com)
- The Afghanistan Draw Down (southasianidea.com)

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